Is marriage financially penalized in the US for low-income couples, esp. on welfare, or not [mainly asked in analyzing reasons for long term "cohabitation" (fornication) esp. among low-income parents]

 Marriage is often penalized for low-income couples in the US, especially those receiving welfare or means-tested benefits.

Welfare and Tax Penalties

• Means-tested benefits: Welfare programs like SNAP (food stamps), Medicaid, housing assistance, and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) calculate eligibility and award levels based on household income. When two low-income adults marry and combine incomes, their joint income frequently exceeds program thresholds, causing sharp reductions or complete loss of benefits.¹²³⁴
• SSI marriage penalty: Married disabled couples receive less in combined SSI benefits than if they remained unmarried. For 2025, the maximum benefit for a single person is $967/month, but for married couples the combined amount is only $1,450/month—less than double the single amount, penalizing marriage.⁵
• Effective income loss: Examples show that a single mother marrying the employed father often sees a major drop in benefits. One study found marriage would reduce combined resources from $81,279 to $66,200—a penalty of $15,709 or about 30% of pre-tax income. A couple combining incomes and marrying also loses housing subsidies, with penalties exceeding half their combined earnings in some cases.³⁴
• Tax penalties: While recent tax reforms reduced marriage penalties for many, they persist especially for low- and moderate-income families. Filing jointly can move a couple into higher tax brackets, and certain credits phase out faster for married filers than for single parents claiming dependents separately.⁶⁷

Policy and Reform

• There is broad public support for eliminating these penalties, as they are seen as harmful to family formation. Legislative proposals have been made to address marriage penalties in SSI and the tax code (e.g., S.73, H.R.1757, "Make Marriage Great Again Act").⁸⁵

Table: Typical Impact of Marriage on Low-Income Couples

Scenario	Pre-marriage Benefits	Post-marriage Benefits	Net Change
SSI (disabled couple)	$1,934 (2 × $967)	$1,450 (married pair)	−$484/month
Welfare+housing (single mom)	$81,279	$66,200	−$15,079/year
Housing subsidy (hypothetical)	$93,927	$66,200	−$27,727/year

Conclusion: Marriage can significantly reduce total welfare and public benefit income for low-income couples, often representing a steep financial penalty, and thereby discouraging marriage among those who rely on assistance.⁴⁵⁶¹³⁂

Footnotes

1. https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Rector-Written-Testimony.pdf ↩ ↩²

2. https://oversight.house.gov/release/hearing-wrap-up-americas-welfare-state-needs-immediate-reform/ ↩

3. https://www.heritage.org/welfare/report/understanding-marriage-penalties-welfare-and-their-impact-society ↩ ↩² ↩³

4. https://www.congress.gov/119/meeting/house/117879/witnesses/HHRG-119-GO27-Wstate-RectorR-20250211.pdf ↩ ↩² ↩³

5. https://accessabilityofficer.com/blog/ssi-marriage-penalty-in-2025-why-disabled-couples-lose-benefits-for-saying-i-do ↩ ↩² ↩³

6. https://ifstudies.org/blog/its-time-to-eliminate-marriage-penalties-in-the-us-tax-code ↩ ↩²

7. https://taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-are-marriage-penalties-and-bonuses ↩

8. https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/320/text ↩

9. https://www.peoplespolicyproject.org/2024/11/26/eliminating-marriage-penalties-through-universalism/ ↩

10. https://turbotax.intuit.com/tax-tips/marriage/7-tax-advantages-of-getting-married/L1XlLCh0m ↩

 For US couples not receiving welfare or means-tested support, marriage may still incur a "marriage penalty"—but this is typically limited to the design of the federal income tax code and, for some, Social Security calculations.

Key Points

• Federal taxes: Since the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, tax brackets are mostly “marriage neutral” for couples earning up to about \$600,000 combined, so most middle-income married couples no longer face major tax penalties solely for marrying. Couples with highly unequal incomes may even receive a "marriage bonus" compared to single filers. However, dual-earner couples and those with children can face a tax penalty if their combined income bumps them into a higher marginal tax bracket than if they filed singly or as head-of-household.^1^5
• With children: Penalties often arise if unmarried partners can file as "single" and "head of household," allowing them to combine two standard deductions and get greater access to tax credits (like the Earned Income Tax Credit, EITC) compared to married parents filing jointly. Married parents may lose or see reduced credits/benefits as their incomes are combined for eligibility.^7
• Social Security: Social Security treats married and unmarried couples differently for benefit and taxation purposes, often penalizing dual-earner married couples who each receive benefits.^3
• High incomes: Most marriage tax penalties are concentrated among higher-income couples (over \$624,000 AGI), who may pay higher rates as a result of joint filing than if remaining unmarried.^10

Table: Marriage Penalty/Bonus for Non-Welfare Couples

Situation	Marriage Penalty / Bonus
Middle-income, unequal earners	Marriage bonus
Dual earners, middle to high income	Small penalty (2–5% of AGI)
With children, unmarried filing HOH	Moderate penalty (loss of tax credits)
High-income (>\$624K AGI)	Up to 2.8% of AGI penalty^1

Conclusion

While severe benefit losses are rare outside welfare systems, US couples not on welfare may still face a small but real tax penalty for marrying, especially dual-earner households with children or high incomes. Most other married couples, or those with very unequal incomes, may not face a penalty and could even benefit from marriage under tax law.

[Supplemental] An AEI/IFS analysis of couples with a youngest child under two found that about 82% of couples in the second and third income quintiles (roughly $24k–$79k) face a marriage penalty in means‑tested benefits (Medicaid, cash welfare, food stamps) if they marry; only about 66% in the bottom quintile face such a penalty. ​Earlier work on AFDC found that program rules were relatively lenient toward cohabitors compared to husbands, meaning that “discouragement of marriage by the AFDC system may lead to increased cohabitation rather than increased female headship,” and that cohabitation was effectively encouraged in some states. ​More recent family‑policy reports argue that welfare design often makes “more financial sense for them to cohabit rather than marry,” especially when combining benefits, tax credits, and eligibility thresholds. ​ ....the system tends to: Make formal marriage economically costly for many lower‑to‑lower‑middle income couples. Leave cohabitation / informal partnerships as the “rational” choice, which then show up in data as unmarried parents and, when the relationship dissolves, as single‑mother households with absent fathers. Sources N‑IUSSP – “America’s single-parent households and missing fathers” U.S. Census – “Parents’ Living Arrangements” (interactive) U.S. Census – “Three-Quarters of Children 6 Years or Younger Live With Two Parents” Childstats.gov – “Family Structure and Children’s Living Arrangements” Fatherhood.org – “Father Absence Statistics” IFS / AEI – “Marriage, Penalized: Does Social-Welfare Policy Affect Family Formation?” Wisconsin IRP – “Beyond Single Mothers: Cohabitation, Marriage, and the US Welfare System” (PDF)